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As required by rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this reply 
brief is “limited to responding to the facts and arguments raised in the appellee’s 
... principal brief.” Specifically, it responds to the State’s claim that the Tooele 
residents’ out-of-court-statements were non-hearsay. See SB at 15-23. It also 
addresses the State’s contention that the legislature expressly prohibits the 
merger of discharge of a firearm and attempted murder. See id. at 31-35. This 
reply does not restate arguments from the opening brief or address matters that 




I.  This Court should reverse because the trial court admitted the 
out-of-court statements of unidentified Tooele residents in 
violation of the rule against hearsay. 
In opening, Martinez argues that the Tooele residents’ statements were 
inadmissible hearsay. See OB at 15-21. The State counters that the statements 
were not hearsay, and even if they were, they were not prejudicial. See SB at 15-
30. Contrary to the State’s claim, the Tooele residents’ statements were offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted. The opening brief adequately addresses the 
State’s no-prejudice claim. See id. at 21-27. 
The record shows that the Tooele residents’ statements were offered for 
their truth. See id. at 15-21. In arguing otherwise, the State faults Martinez for 
incorporating considerations of relevance and detail in his hearsay analysis. See 
SB at 19-23. Moreover, it relies on cases that are distinguishable from this case. 
See id. at 17-18. 
 First, the State is wrong to suggest that the hearsay determination is 
neither informed by the relevance of the purported non-truth purpose nor the 
statement’s content or detail. See id. at 19-23.“Whether a statement is offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted is a question of law . . . .” Haltom, 2005 UT App 
348, ¶8, 121 P.3d 42. In answering this question, “[i]t is necessary to look to the 
real purpose of the offered statement, not the purpose urged by its proponent, to 
determine if it is offered to prove truth.” State v. Wells, 522 N.W.2d 304, 308 n.1 
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994); United States v. Edelen, 561 F. App'x 226, 234 (4th Cir. 
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2014) (“In order to determine whether an out-of-court statement qualifies as 
inadmissible hearsay under this Rule, the district court must ‘identify [ ] 
the actual purpose for which a party is introducing’ the statement at issue.”). 
 In discerning the real purpose, Utah courts have relied on objective 
considerations taken in light of all the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. McNeil, 
2013 UT App 134, ¶49, 302 P.3d 844. For instance, our courts have considered 
the extent to which the proffered purpose was “an issue” in the case, see Stratford 
v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah 1984); whether the relevance of the 
statement depends on its truth, McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶49; Francis v. Nat'l 
DME, 2015 UT App 119, ¶55, 350 P.3d 615; how the statement was used, McNeil, 
2013 UT App 134, ¶49; Francis, 2015 UT App 119, ¶55; and the content, detail, 
and specificity of the statements. State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶24, 155 P.3d 
909; see also Wells, 522 N.W.2d at 308 n.1 (“By eliciting specific statements, not 
merely focusing on the fact a conversation occurred, the State attempted to 
establish the truth of the facts asserted in the conversation.”). While no single 
factor is dispositive, all of these considerations inform whether a statement is 
offered for its truth. See Stratford, 689 P.2d at 364; Francis, 2015 UT App 119, 
¶55; McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶49; Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶24. 
 The State suggests that concerns over relevance and unnecessary detail are 
the concerns of other rules. See SB at 19-23. True, other rules may be offended by 
unnecessarily detailed statements that are offered to prove a matter that is not in 
dispute. E.g., Utah R. Evid. Rule 403. But these circumstances also offer objective 
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evidence of the real purpose for which a statement is offered. See, e.g., McNeil, 
2013 UT App 134, ¶49.  
Moreover, as shown, Utah courts recognize that considerations of detail, 
content, and relevance have a place in the hearsay analysis. See Stratford, 689 
P.2d at 364; Francis, 2015 UT App 119, ¶55; McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶49; 
Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶24. And so do courts elsewhere. E.g., Wells, 522 N.W.2d 
at 308 n.1 (“A statement is offered to prove the truth of its assertion if the 
substance of the statement must be believed by the jury to have true relevance in 
the case.”); Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 566–67 (Ind. 2014) 
(“If the fact sought to be proved under the suggested non-hearsay purpose is not 
relevant, or it is relevant but its danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs its probative value, the hearsay objection should be sustained.”); 
People v. Jura, 817 N.E.2d 968, 974–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (rejecting the State’s 
argument that the content of the statement does not matter, and looking to the 
content and substance of the challenged statement to determine that is was 
hearsay).1 
                                                          
1 The State says in a footnote that Martinez’s “relevance-based arguments 
are unpreserved.” SB at 20 n. 5. This argument is misplaced. Martinez does not 
argue, and could not argue, that the challenged statements themselves are 
irrelevant under rule 401. See OB at 16-21. Indeed, the statements are relevant—
just not for a valid non-truth purpose. See id. To the extent Martinez relies on 
principles of relevance, he does so only to aid in the interpretation of the primary 
issue on appeal: whether the challenged statements were offered for their truth. 
See id. Martinez was not required to preserve all of his “arguments for or against 
a particular ruling on an issue raised below.” State v. Fahina, 2017 UT App 111, 
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The State also relies on a series of Utah cases for the proposition that 
“[t]his Court holds that out-of-court statements offered to explain actions are not 
hearsay.” SB at 17. These cases are distinguishable because the various objective 
factors discussed above demonstrated that the statements were offered for a 
purpose other than their truth. See supra pp. 2-3. 
In State v. Pedersen, out-of-court statements were offered to explain why a 
victim advocate reported suspicions of sexual abuse, but the actual substance and 
content of the statements was not admitted. 2010 UT App 38, ¶¶6, 23-24, 227 
P.3d 1264. In this case, by contrast, the hearsay repeated the “definite,” detailed 
allegations of the Tooele residents and identified Martinez as the culprit. Davis, 
2007 UT App 13, ¶24; OB at 20. 
In State v. Perez, it was clear from the context that the actual purpose of 
the statement, “somebody told me the car was stolen,” was to explain subsequent 
action. 924 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). There, the statement was offered by 
the defense through the testimony of the defendant, who was charged with theft 
by receiving a stolen car. Id. at 2-3. Under these circumstances, it was evident 
that the defendant was not offering the statement for its truth because a truth 
inference actually hurt the proponent/defendant. See id. Contrarily, here, the 
context shows that the statements were offered for their truth because the State 
                                                                                                                                                                                           





offered them during its case in chief, and a truth inference supported the 
elements that the State was required prove. See R.709; see also OB 21-25. 
Furthermore, in In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), and State v. 
Loose, 2000 UT 11, 994 P.2d 1237, the non-truth purposes for which the 
statements were offered were in “issue.” Stratford, 689 P.2d at 364. In G.Y., a 
parental termination case, the DCFS services provided to the appellant/parent 
were an important factor in the trial court’s termination decision. 962 P.2d at 83. 
Thus, the challenged statements were non-hearsay where they “establish[ed] that 
sufficient services were offered” and “explain[ed] actions [the DCFS caseworker] 
took in performing her duties.” Id. at 86.  
Meanwhile, Loose was a child sex abuse case where the trial court 
identified as an issue the “significant amount of time between the dates of the 
alleged offenses and the date the Defendant was charged.” 2000 UT 11, ¶25 
(Howe, J., dissenting). Thus, the victim’s initial out-of-court disclosures to her 
therapist were “essential for the jury to understand how these allegations against 
the Defendant arose . . . .” Id. ¶¶3-4, 10. Here, by contrast, the alleged non-truth 
purpose was not an issue. See OB at 19-20. Indeed, there was no issue or dispute 
regarding why Rafael asked Martinez, “are you looking for me to kill me.” See id. 
The State’s case law is thus distinguishable because in those cases, various 
objective factors indicated that the statements were offered for a valid non-truth 
purpose. But here, for the reasons stated in opening, the objective circumstances 
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demonstrate that the statements were offered for their truth. See id. at 15-21. 
Thus, the Tooele residents’ statements constituted hearsay. 
II.  Martinez’s discharge of a firearm convictions must be vacated. 
In opening, Martinez asks this Court to vacate his discharge convictions 
under subsection 76-1-402(1)’s single criminal episode doctrine; under 
subsection 76-1-402(3)’s lesser-included offense doctrine; and under the doctrine 
of common law merger. See OB at 28-44. At the outset, Martinez acknowledges 
that during the pendency of this appeal, the Utah Supreme Court issued State v. 
Wilder, 2018 UT 17. There, the supreme court “renounce[d] the common-law 
merger test.” Id. ¶38. Thus, Martinez’s common-law merger argument is no 
longer in play.  
Meanwhile, the State does not challenge Martinez’s contention that his 
convictions arose from the “same act” under subsection 76-1-402(1)’s single 
criminal episode doctrine. See generally SB at 31-39. At this point, then, the 
primary contested issues are: (1) whether—as the State argues—the legislature 
expressly prohibits merger of felony discharge and attempted murder, see SB at 
31-35; and (2) whether discharge and attempted murder share a lesser-greater 
relationship for purposes of subsection 76-1-402(3). See id. at 35-39. 
The opening brief adequately addresses the lesser-greater relationship 
issue. See OB at 33-37. This reply addresses the State’s contention that the 
“murder statute explicitly permits both separate convictions and punishments for 
felony discharge of a firearm and attempted murder.” See id. at 35. The plain 
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language of the murder statute defeats this argument in several ways. As shown 
below, the murder statute’s merger exemption does not apply to attempt crimes; 
it does not apply to knowing/intentional murder; or alternatively, it only negates 
the application of lesser-included offense merger. 
The murder statute describes the various ways a defendant can commit 
murder. One way to commit murder is to “intentionally or knowingly cause[] the 
death of another.”  Utah Code § 76-5-203(2)(a). This was the provision under 
which the State alleged that Martinez attempted murder. R.1-6. 
Another way to commit murder is to kill someone during the commission 
of a “predicate offense,” a.k.a. felony murder. Utah Code § 76-5-203(2)(d). 
Predicate offense is defined to include a long list of felonies, including discharge 
of a firearm. Utah Code § 76-5-203(1)(v). Then, subsection § 76-5-203(5) states: 
(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that 
constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime of 
murder. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate 
offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate 
offense, may also be convicted of, and punished for, the separate 
offense. 
 
Utah Code § 76-5-203(5). 
 The State concedes that subsection (5)(b) of the merger exemption applies 
only to felony murder and thus, “does not apply” here. SB at 33. It contends, 
however, that subsection (5)(a) applies to all murders—including 
knowing/intentional murder. Id. Thus, in the State’s view, subsection (5)(a) 
allows for separate convictions and punishments for felony discharge of a firearm 
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and attempted murder. Id. Contrary to the State’s claim, subsection (5)(a) does 
not exempt attempted murder and felony discharge from the merger 
requirements of section 76-1-402. 
 The Utah Supreme Court has held that the “[l]egislature exempts a statute 
from the requirements of the merger doctrine only when ‘an explicit indication of 
legislative intent is present.’” State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶70, 361 P.3d 104 
(quoting State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶11, 122 P.3d 615). In deciding whether a 
statute is exempt, the plain statutory language controls. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶11. 
Thus, the most obvious problem with the State’ argument is that section 76-5-
203(5)(a) plainly applies to the crime of murder—not attempted murder.  
The State tries to explain away this problem by citing to the Utah Supreme 
Court case, State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106. But Casey does not address 
merger or the applicability of the merger exemption to attempted murder. See 
generally id. Nor does it state that legislative references to “murder” necessarily 
include “attempted murder.”  Id. On the contrary, Casey recognizes that 
attempted murder requires “different elements” than murder. Id. ¶15. Casey, 
therefore, does not help the State. 
The plain language of section 76-5-203(5)(a)’s merger exception is even 
more fatal to the State’s argument.  The provision omits any reference to 
“attempted murder,” indicating that the exemption apply only to “murder” 
charges. Utah Code § 76-5-203(5)(a). Moreover, the explicit reference to 
“attempted murder” in the immediately preceding paragraph demonstrates that 
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the omission was purposeful. Utah Code § 76-5-203(4)(c) (“This affirmative 
defense reduces charges only from . . . attempted murder to attempted 
manslaughter.” (emphasis added)); see also Phillips v. Dep’t of Com., Div. of Sec., 
2017 UT App 84, ¶22, 397 P.3d 863 (“Because ‘[this court] presume[s] that the 
expression of one term should be interpreted as the exclusion of another,’ [this 
court] ‘seek[s] to give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all 
omissions to be purposeful.’”). Indeed, had the legislature intended to exempt 
“attempted murder” as well, “it would have said so.” Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 
UT App 75, ¶8, 45 P.3d 520. Thus, in the absence of an “explicit indication” 
otherwise, section 76-1-402’s merger principles apply to attempted murder and 
felony discharge. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶70. 
In any event, the plain language and structure of the murder statute 
suggest that the merger exemption does not apply to knowing/intentional 
attempted murder—only felony murder. The murder statute’s merger exemption 
applies to “murder” and “[a]ny predicate offense described in Subsection (1) . . . .” 
Utah Code § 76-5-203(5)(a). Subsection (1) defines predicate offense. Utah Code 
§ 76-5-203(1). Specifically, it states “[a]s used in this section, ‘predicate offense’ 
means . . .,” and then it goes on to enumerate a list of felonies—among them, 
felony discharge. Id. Yet “[a]s used” in the murder section,” the notion of a 
“predicate offense” is unique to the definition of felony murder; in felony murder, 
it is the “predicate offense” that provides a basis for the murder charge. Utah 
Code § 76-5-203(1), (2)(d). Indeed, “‘[p]redicate’ means ‘to base or establish (a 
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statement or action, for example).’” Phillips v. Com., 694 S.E.2d 805, 810 (Va. Ct. 
App. 2010) (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1382 (4th ed. 2006)). Moreover, a “predicate offense” is commonly 
understood as “[a]n earlier offense that can be used to enhance a sentence levied 
for a later conviction.” Black's Law Dictionary 1188 (9th ed. 2004). Consistent 
with this definition, Utah courts have held that predicate felonies are enhancing 
factors that are used to enhance an otherwise unintentional killing to murder. 
State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Utah 1990).  
By using the word “predicate,” the statute indicates that the enumerated 
felonies must form the “base” for something else, i.e. murder. See Utah Code § 
76-5-203(1), (2), (5). While enumerated felonies provide a base for felony 
murder, they do not form the base for the other variations of murder. See Utah 
Code § 76-5-203(1), (2). Thus, for purposes of felony murder, the enumerated 
felony offenses operate as predicates for murder, making them “predicate 
offenses” that are subject to the merger exemption. See Utah Code § 76-5-203(1), 
(2), (5). But when a defendant is charged with another variation of murder, the 
enumerated offenses are not predicates for murder. See Utah Code § 76-5-203(1), 
(2). Under these circumstances, they are not “predicate offenses” to which the 
merger exemption attaches. See Utah Code § 76-5-203(1), (2), (5). 
In this case, Martinez was charged with attempted knowing/intentional 
murder. R.1-6. While felony discharge is included in subsection (1)’s list of 
enumerated felonies, it does not form the base of knowing/intentional murder. 
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See id. Thus, in this prosecution for attempted knowing/intentional murder, 
felony discharge is not a true “predicate offense,” and thus, the merger exemption 
does not apply. See id. 
Martinez recognizes that this Court must give meaning to both subsections 
of the merger exemption so as to avoid superfluity. Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of 
Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶11, 368 P.3d 846. The State attempts to do so by 
interpreting subsection 5(a) to apply to all variations of murder and subsection 
5(b) to apply to felony murder alone. See SB at 33. But holding that both 
subsections apply to felony murder does not render any provision superfluous. 
Subsections 5(a) and 5(b) of the merger exemption target the distinct 
merger provisions of subsection 76-1-402. See Utah Code §§ 76-5-203(5); 76-1-
402(1), (3).  As explained in opening, section 76-1-402 provides two independent 
grounds for vacating Martinez’s discharge convictions: (1) they violate the single 
criminal episode doctrine of subsection 76-1-402(1); and (2) they violate the 
lesser-included offense doctrine of subsection 76-1-402(3). See OB at 28-37. Both 
subsections of the merger exemption target felony murder, but subsection 5(a) 
negates the application of the lesser-included offense doctrine, and subsection 
5(b) negates the application of the single criminal episode doctrine. See Utah 
Code §§ 76-5-203(5); 76-1-402(1), (3).   
This is born out by the statutory language. Subsection 5(b) expressly allows 
a defendant to be “punished for” both murder and a predicate offense. Utah Code 
§ 76-5-203(5)(b). Section 76-1-402(1)’s single criminal episode doctrine is also 
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concerned with “punish[ment],” prohibiting multiple punishments for different 
offenses that are based on “the same act of a defendant.” Utah Code § 76-1-
402(1).  
Meanwhile, unlike subsection 5(b), subsection 5(a) does not expressly 
allow for multiple punishments and omits reference to “punish[ment]” 
altogether. Utah Code § 76-5-203(5); see also Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 
1999 UT 110, ¶14, 993 P.2d 875 (“[O]missions in statutory language should ‘be 
taken note of and given effect.’”). Instead, subsection 5(a) states that a predicate 
offense “does not merge with the crime of murder.” Utah Code § 76-5-203(5)(a)  
(emphasis added). While the word “merger” is often used as a shorthand 
(including in this brief), “merger” is a legal term of art which, in criminal law, is 
defined as “[t]he absorption of a lesser included offense into a more serious 
offense when a person is charged with both crimes.” Merger, Black's Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added); see also State v. Richter, 402 P.3d 
1016, 1025 n.11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (“The merger doctrine only ‘applies to lesser-
included offenses.’”). By using a term associated with lesser-included offense 
merger and omitting reference to “punish[ment],” it is evident that the legislature 
intended for subsection 5(a) to negate the application of subsection 76-1-402(3)’s 
lesser-included offense doctrine. See Utah Code §§ 76-5-203(5); 76-1-402(1), (3).  
Thus, the statutory language suggests that subsections 5(a) and 5(b) work to 
negate the distinct provisions of the merger statute in the context of a felony 
murder prosecution. See id. 
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Finally, even if subsection 5(a) does—as the State argues—apply to 
Martinez’s knowing/intentional attempted murder conviction, this Court should 
still vacate Martinez’s discharge convictions. See Utah Code §§ 76-5-203(5); 76-1-
402(1), (3). As argued above, subsection 5(a) precludes the application of lesser-
included offense merger. See id. But unlike subsection 5(b), it does not allow for 
multiple “punish[ments]” so as to preclude the application of the single criminal 
episode doctrine. See id. Accordingly, Martinez’s discharge convictions should be 
vacated because he was punished twice for the “same act” in violation of section 
76-1-402(1)’s single criminal episode doctrine. See OB at 28-33. 
In short, the merger exemption of subsection 5(a) does not apply in this 
case because Martinez was convicted of attempted murder. Still, it does not apply 
because Martinez was convicted of attempted knowing/intentional murder, and 
the exemption applies only to felony murder. Alternatively, the exemption does 
not negate the application of section 76-1-402(1)’s single criminal episode 
doctrine. Thus, this Court may apply the provisions of section 76-1-402 to vacate 
Martinez’s discharge convictions. See id. at 28-37. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons here and in opening, Martinez respectfully asks this Court 
to reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. Alternatively, he asks this 
Court to vacate his convictions for discharge of a firearm. 
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